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From the advance publicity for Mortal Peril: Our Inalienable Right to
Healthcare?,' one might suppose the book would offer a closely reasoned
argument for a market-based health care system with minimum govern-
ment involvement and maximum deference to individual autonomy.
While Epstein does advocate such a system, he fails to provide the rea-
soned argument. The book actually presents a collection of topics that
seem to have been chosen because Epstein has strong views about them,
not because taken together they yield a coherent view of health policy.
To make matters worse, the discussion of each topic is a confusing mix-
ture of broad generalizations, often unsupported by argument or data,
and narrow analyses of specific laws, court cases, and regulations.
The first half of this 503-page book is about access to health care. It
includes chapters on the existence of a right to health care, futile medical
treatment, care for the indigent, wealth and disability, community rating
and pre-existing conditions, Medicare reform, and the Clinton health
plan. The second half addresses self-determination and choice, with chap-
ters on the buying and selling of babies and human organs, euthanasia
and physician-assisted suicide, and the malpractice liability system. Since
I cannot cover all this ground adequately in a review, I have chosen to fo-
cus primarily on the access issues.
A RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE?
Epstein's central thesis can be stated simply: The roots of the current
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problems with the American health care system lie in universal accep-
tance of a false premise-the existence of a right to health care.2 Ac-
cording to Epstein, basing a health care system on such a right is wrong
not only on philosophical grounds (there are no positive rights, only
negative rights),3 but also on practical grounds, since such a right to
health care cannot be implemented successfully. 4 The result of this false
premise is a jumble of burdensome rules and costly health care
"entitlements" that fail to make sense on equity or efficiency grounds. 5
There is an obvious response to this thesis. Not all Americans believe
there is a right to health care, and those who do believe in such a right
disagree fiercely on its extent. It might be more plausible to blame our
contradictory policies on the lack of a consensus on health care rights.
While such a response is not bad, it does not go far enough. A better
response would be that the rights debate is irrelevant to practical policy.
In fact, it is a dangerous distraction. The policy issue is not, "Does every
American have a moral right to health care?" but, "Would designing the
health care system to ensure every American a decent minimum of
health care be good public policy?"
Consider the interstate highway system. This massive government
undertaking is popular, but not, as far as I know, because the public be-
lieves in "a right to drive." In a market economy, why not leave it to pri-
vate enterprise to build toll roads for profit? The common sense answer
is that we would not like the results, given the cost of toll collection, the
opportunity for monopoly pricing, and the advantages of a rational over-
all design. Consequently, government has built the interstate highways
and financed them with taxes.
Once a society is willing to make some things collective tax-financed
projects, for whatever reason, the existence of a positive right to health
care is beside the point. The issue is, should guaranteeing universal access
to a decent minimum of health care be one of those things?
Epstein prefers limited government, but I am not sure how limited;
perhaps he thinks the public provision of highways is a mistake. If his ba-
sic premise is that governments should confine themselves to protecting
negative rights-from which it follows that the public should not be taxed
to fund highways, public schools, scientific research, and libraries-
probably very few Americans would agree with him, and the book has
little to offer the current health policy debate.6
2. See icL at 1-4.
3. See id. at 6-19.
4. See id- at 43-58.
5. See id. at 14-17.
6. For the purposes of this Review, however, I assume his position to be somewhat less
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THE MARKET FAILURE ARGUMENT FOR GUARANTEED ACCESS
Economics provides a framework for thinking about these matters
under the theory of the general equilibrium of perfectly competitive
markets (a framework which Epstein often employs in the book). The
theory offers both a rationale for a presumption in favor of markets as
efficient resource allocation mechanisms and a basis for identifying cir-
cumstances under which markets are likely to be inefficient (i.e., a theory
of "market failure").
Market failure is the standard reason for the public provision of
highways and (albeit somewhat differently) can also be an argument for
guaranteeing access to a decent minimum of health care. Kenneth Arrow
outlined the basis for this in 1963 in a classic article which applies insights
from the economics of uncertainty to health care.' Arrow and others' had
extended general equilibrium theory to include uncertainty and shown
that the optimality properties of perfectly competitive market equilib-
rium continue to hold, provided there are "futures markets" allowing
participants in the economy to reallocate consumption and production
freely across all possible states of the world. In real economies, the com-
plexity and transaction costs associated with such markets severely limit
their availability. The main significance of the result, therefore, was to
identify an important class of market failures associated with the absence
of a full set of markets for risk-bearing.
The health insurance market is an example of such market failure.
Since consumers are uncertain about their future health and therefore
about the amount they will want to spend on health care, they find health
insurance useful; however, private insurance is limited in its ability to
protect against the financial risk of ill health. For example, in a perfectly
competitive market, insurers adjust premiums according to risk, so that
people who are expected to spend more on health care pay more. People
who are already ill or have a very high probability of illness may be un-
able to buy insurance at all.
In a narrow sense, linking premiums to risk is efficient, since the cost
radical.
7. For background information on the theory of general equilibrium and competitive mar-
kets, see WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 55-
57, 536-555 (5th ed. 1991).
8. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM.
ECON. REV. 941 (1963).
9. See generally G. DEBREU, THEORY OF VALUES (1959); M. Allais, Gdneralisation des
theories de l'quilibre iconomique ginral et du rendement social au cas du risque, ECONO-
METRIE 1-20 (1953); Kenneth J. Arrow, Les r6les des valeurs boursieres pour la reparation la
meilleure des risques, ECONOMETRIE 41-46 (1953); E. Baudier, L'introduction du temps dans la
thdorie de l'dquilibre g~ndral, CAHiERS ECONOMIQUES 9-16 (1959); G. Debreu, Une 6conomique
de l'incertain, ECONOMIE APPLIQUAE 13, 111-16 (1960), cited in Arrow, supra note 8, at 945 n.6.
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of the risk-bearing is shared in accord with the contribution of each in-
sured to the total risk.10 In a broader sense, it is inefficient, since people
cannot protect themselves against deteriorations in risk status over time
or against being born into a high risk state, unless there are complex fu-
tures markets which do not (and often could not) exist." Arrow con-
cluded that there is a strong case for collective action to provide non-
market mechanisms for risk-bearing such as social insurance. 2
Arrow's basic point holds in the simple model in which people maxi-
mize utility functions that depend only on their own consumption. Its
practical significance is increased, however, if utility is affected by the
consumption of health care by others. 3 This is often the case. A close as-
sociate's poor health may affect the benefits a person receives from the
association, as well as generate claims for assistance. 4 People may also be
unselfishly concerned about the well-being of others, whether family,
friends, or strangers.
Epstein is aware of Arrow's arguments but rejects them. 5 He claims
that efficiency demands the adjustment of premiums to risk; anything
else is forced redistribution of wealth from the healthy to the sick, to
which he is opposed on principle. 6 In other words, he misses the point,
even though Arrow says explicitly:
[A] good part of the preference for redistribution expressed in government
taxation and expenditure policies and private charity can be reinterpreted as
desire for insurance.., virtually nowhere is there a system of subsidies that
has as its aim simply an equalization of income. The subsidies or other gov-
ernmental help go to those who are disadvantaged in life by events the inci-
dence of which is popularly regarded as unpredictable... optimality, in a
context which includes risk-bearing, includes much that appears to be moti-
vated by distributional value judgments when looked at in a narrower con-
text. 7
10. See Arrow, supra note 8, at 963-64.
11. See id
12. See id. at 967. Arrow's article also highlights other market failure elements in health
care, such as the importance of imperfect information and the resulting role of the physician as
agent for the patient. See id. at 949-52.
13. See id at 954 ("[Tlhere is a more general interdependence, the concern of individuals
for the health of others .... The taste for improving the health of others appears to be stronger
than for improving other aspects of their welfare. In interdependencies generated by concern
for the welfare of others there is always a theoretical case for collective action if each partici-
pant derives satisfaction from the contributions of all.").
14. Medicare is broadly popular because it benefits not only those who are old now and
those who will be old someday, but also their children and grandchildren, nieces and nephews-
all those who would be obliged to help the elderly get health care if the program didn't exist.
15. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 2-4, 2 n.3 (The reader should note that Arrow's classic
article is the third citation in this book of 852 footnotes).
16. See id at 2, 122.
17. Arrow, supra note 8, at 947-48.
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THE ROLE OF PRIVATE CHARITY
Although Epstein defines social insurance as forced redistribution
and rejects it, he does have an alternative for those too poor or too un-
healthy to obtain private insurance: voluntary redistribution.' s Govern-
ment action is unnecessary, he says, because people share a moral sense
that they should help others obtain important health care and respond by
giving generously to charity." In fact, he chastises advocates of govern-
ment intervention for their lack of trust in the kindness of Americans:
It is therefore regrettable that so many academics regard charitable re-
sponses as occupying only a tiny comer of the social space... The only hu-
man interactions they envision are market exchanges or coerced exactions.2
Private charity is recognized as a response to market failure; the issue
is whether it is adequate. At the theoretical level, if the motive for charity
is interdependent utilities, charitable giving is a public good and the stan-
dard arguments for the inefficiency of the voluntary outcome apply. The
general welfare could be unambiguously improved (in the sense that eve-
ryone would be at least as well off and some would be better off) with the
right structure of mandatory contributions.
Epstein rejects this theoretical argument,21 and also makes strong
claims about the practical advantages of private over public assistance:
"The same amount of money distributed... does more good in the for-
mer system than the latter, which chews up huge portions of its revenues
in administrative expenses and loses another significant proportion to
fraud and abuse at every level of its operation." 22 He offers no empirical
evidence for this statement, however, and it may not be correct. Most
private charities spend a significant part of their funds on fund-raising
and administration, rather than on direct assistance, and are not immune
18. See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 38-39.
19. See id. at 30-31, 36,38.
20. Id. at 36.
21. See supra note 15; see also Allen E. Buchanan, The Right to a Decent Minimum of
Health Care, 54 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 13 (1984). Epstein is familiar with Buchanan's analysis but
rejects it; however, it is clear from his discussion that he does not understand it. For example, he
seems to think that as long as all wealthy individuals contribute money, the problem disappears,
and that allowing a tax deduction for charitable contributions will bring this fantasy about. He
portrays the tax deduction as a matching grant, paid in effect from all other citizens, to those
individuals who are prepared to spend their own resources in charitable endeavors. See gener-
ally EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 37-39 (discussing Buchanan). But if it is wrong to tax people to
support the endeavors directly, why isn't it wrong to use their taxes to give the matching grants?
Furthermore, Epstein fails to mention, let alone justify, the fact that under the tax deduction,
the richer the donor, the greater the tax rebate per dollar of contribution. See generally I.R.C.
§§ 1, 170(a)(1998) (noting that under a system of progressive taxation, the higher a taxpayer's
bracket, the more an itemized deduction for a charitable donation will cost the government).
22. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 37.
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from fraud and abuse. 3
Epstein also asserts that private charity is better than government at
targeting aid to truly needy people who will use it well.24 This also is not
self-evident. Who hasn't wondered whether the panhandler asking for
money for food is really in need, and whether he wouldn't actually spend
one's money on alcohol or drugs? Organizations may be better able to
discriminate than the average individual, but to do so they must spend
resources to investigate, without the advantages of government's infor-
mation sources and legal sanctions.
Too often, the key to receiving private charity is simply knowing a re-
porter. In a recent example, the parents of Iowa septuplets were over-
whelmed with donations, from diapers to a new house, while the parents
of sextuplets in the District of Columbia received nothing-until the
publicity surrounding the Iowa births led someone to bring their situation
to the press's attention25
Accountability is an important issue, especially in the light of Ep-
stein's claim that charities should be completely free to spend their funds
as they wish.26 (He argues that even if a charity announces a policy on
who will receive assistance, it should not be legally required to observe
it.)27 Government must account to taxpayers through the political proc-
23. The recent United Way scandal was a dramatic example, and a particularly sad one,
since the United Way is a creative attempt to reduce the inherent inefficiency in raising and al-
locating charitable funds. For general background on the United Way scandal, see John S. Gla-
ser, THE UNITED WAY SCANDAL: AN INSIDER'S AccOuNT OF WHAT WENT WRONG AND WHY
(1994).
24. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 55-56.
25. See generally Patrice Gaines, Iowa Miracle Brings Help for D.C. Sextuplets, WASH.
POST Gl1 (Nov. 22, 1997). In light of Epstein's opinions on taking health risks, it is interesting
to note that the Iowa births resulted from a controversial decision to implant seven fertilized
eggs and let all seven resulting pregnancies continue to term, whereas the DC births did not did
not involve in vitro fertilization. See Gina Kolata, Many Specialists Are Left in No Mood for
Celebration, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1997, at A5.
26. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 84, 104-05 (discussing EMTALA).
27. See id at 82-85 (arguing against the holding in Wilmington General Hospital v. Man-
love, 174 A.2d 135 (Del. 1961), in which a hospital that had previously offered emergency serv-
ices to the general public was found liable on the basis of this established practice for refusing
care to a patient). He makes this point most strongly in the context of his discussion of
EMTALA, a law which obliges hospitals that have emergency rooms to provide emergency
care on demand, without requiring advance payment. See id. at 91-105; see also id at 84 ("There
are enormous practical benefits to being able to announce standing policies [e.g. the provision
of emergency care] without being legally forced to adhere to them."); id. at 103 ("As far as gov-
ernment is concerned, any hospital should be able to 'just say no' to any patient, without giving
reasons for its decisions."). Epstein also sees no reason why hospitals should not use charity
cases in medical education:
[I]t is wholly indefensible to attack as immoral the common practice of having medical
residents perform their initial operations on charitable cases, albeit the outcomes are
on average likely to be less successful than when experienced surgeons operate.
Clearly we cannot exhaust the talents of the ablest surgeons by requiring them to per-
form all cases; nor could we train the next generation of surgeons unless younger sur-
geons gain experience in dealing with live patients, if only to learn from their mistakes.
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ess, imperfect though it may be. Individual donors can hold charities ac-
countable only through the threat of reduced contributions in the future,
and then only if they can obtain trustworthy information about the way
their money is being used. Because this is so difficult, there is public de-
mand for government regulation of charities.2
Epstein acknowledges that with voluntary redistribution, not all those
in need will be helped: "[T]he common law rules had no built-in gyro-
scope to right any imbalance .... The common law system offers no
grandiose guarantees that help will be forthcoming, but it relies on the
decentralized efforts of private groups to fill the vital function."29 In other
words, people cannot rely on charity for the security they do not get from
the market.
It is significant that nowhere in the book does Epstein provide a sys-
tematic discussion of the position of children and people with disabilities
in his world of purely voluntary exchange.0 Children are dependent on
their parents, who may be too poor or too irresponsible to ensure that
they have health care, and people with disabilities are at a disadvantage
in both the labor and health insurance markets. Yet the clear implication
of his analysis is that children and people with disabilities must rely on
the kindness of others for access to health care, with no guarantee that
there will be enough kindness to go around.
THE MORAL ARGUMENT FOR GUARANTEED ACCESS
Epstein's optimism about private charity is ultimately unconvincing.
The real problem, however, is more basic: a fundamental misunder-
standing of the nature of the shared "moral intuition." To him, the per-
ceived obligation to help others is personal, an issue for an individual and
his conscience, whereas to most Americans, it is probably collective. 1
The intuition behind the collective obligation is that a society is morally
obliged to ensure all of its members have a decent minimum of basic
goods such as food, shelter, and health care-not because everyone nec-
essarily has a right to these goods, but because societies that fail to guar-
antee them are morally repugnant.
Id at 115.
28. See id at 86-87.
29. Id. at 40.
30. Chapter 5, called "Wealth and Disability," raises expectations that the disability issues
will be discussed, but the disability section is only a few pages long and focuses entirely on the
relationship between the Oregon Medicaid rationing proposal and the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act (42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994)). See i. at 107-20; see also infra note 55 and accompanying
text. There are brief discussions of disability in other chapters, but only in the context of argu-
ments against prohibitions on discrimination on the basis of disability in insurance and employ-
ment. See, e.g., EPsTEIN, supra note 1, at 141-45.
31. See infra note 41.
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It follows that every member of a society has a moral and civic obliga-
tion not merely to write an occasional check to a health charity, but to
participate, through established democratic processes, in the creation of a
structure to discharge the collective obligation. Such a structure will nec-
essarily involve some compulsory redistribution from the rich to the poor
as well as from the healthy to the unhealthy. This is the consensus that is
now the implicit basis for health policy, not acceptance of an individual
right to health care or an individual obligation to help others.
Defining the policy goal in terms of societal obligation avoids some of
the objections Epstein raises to a positive rights framework. As Epstein
notes, the amount of health care at stake cannot be unlimited, whether
one speaks of rights or obligations 2 In a societal obligation framework,
however, it is more apparent that health care is only one of our collective
projects, albeit one of high priority, and that overall societal resources
will and should influence the specific standard of care guaranteed.
Moreover, there is no ambiguity about where the obligation falls; it falls
on the same democratic institutions used for other collective projects, like
national defense, interstate highways, and the protection of negative
rights.
The public's acceptance of such an obligation is based on a combina-
tion of religious beliefs, philosophical analysis, moral principles, pragma-
tism, self-interest, and plain "gut feelings." Since Epstein defends nega-
tive rights with the heuristic device of rational contracting 'behind the
veil of ignorance,"33 it is reasonable to apply that device here as a rough
check on the plausibility of this acceptance.
Suppose we ask the following question of people who don't know the
circumstances into which they will be born: "Would you prefer a society
which accepts a collective obligation to guarantee universal access to a
decent minimum of health care, or a society in which private insurance
and private charity are the only means of protection from the conse-
quences of the natural lottery?" The decision would likely be for univer-
sal access. In fact, I think that even someone who is not "behind the
veil"-someone who knows his health status, assets, and earning capaci-
ties, but is also aware that these can change in unpredictable ways-
would prefer at least some social insurance over Epstein's alternative.
Is GUARANTEED ACCESS AFFORDABLE?
But, as Epstein might say, what if implementing such a guarantee is so
costly that the first society has far fewer resources for other goals relative
32. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 44.
33. Id. at 9.
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to the second? First, note that contrary to the impression Epstein gives,
this question also arises with negative rights. A negative right is worth lit-
tle without a corresponding societal obligation to enforce it. A person
who is robbed has a claim against the robber, not against the bystanders
who fail to come to his defense. 35 Nevertheless, surely the bystanders are
obliged to participate in a societal response-by maintaining a criminal
justice system to prevent and prosecute such crimes-even if they are
strong enough to defend themselves against attack. And a good criminal
justice system does not come cheaply. 6
In the case of health care, the issue is not whether the first society
might spend somewhat more in total on health care (after all, the goal is
to increase access), but whether social insurance would bring with it large
extra expenses for overconsumption and administration.
Increased spending could result because changed financial incentives
lead to inefficient use of care. When people are insured and do not pay
directly for their care, price does not force them to weigh the benefits of
care against the cost; for efficiency, there must be limits on beneficial
care such as non-price rationing.37 Such rationing is as necessary in pri-
vate insurance as it is in social insurance, however. If the private insur-
ance market can do this, there is no reason in principle why a well-
designed social insurance system cannot do it, given that the societal ob-
ligation is explicitly understood to be defined in relation to total societal
resources.
Increased spending could also result because changed financial incen-
tives lead people to be less careful of their health. Epstein makes much of
this effect, and argues that it would be greater under social insurance be-
cause social insurance breaks the link between insurance premiums and
risk category.3" For the effect to be significant, however, there must be a
strong connection from premium differential to behavior to health. Ep-
stein likely overstates both the control people have over their health and
34. "In contrast [to the tradition of positive rights] the tradition of negative rights, whatever
its flaws, at least avoids the sin of extravagance." Id. at 7.
35. See generally Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Construction and Application of "Good
Samaritan" Statutes, 68 A.L.R. 4th 294 (1989).
36. In fact, in the era of the O.J. Simpson and Menendez trials and seemingly endless inves-
tigations by special prosecutors, some might say that the negative rights tradition can be associ-
ated with extravagance.
37. This effect is called moral hazard. It has been compared to the situation that arises
when people dining out together decide in advance to split the bill evenly. Each person has a
financial incentive to order a more expensive meal, yet the group as a whole must pay the total
cost. If the check is to be evenly divided, it would be prudent to agree to some constraints on
ordering, such as choosing from a limited menu, i.e., to submit to some non-price rationing.
38. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 52-53 ("Social insurance builds in at the ground level a
system of cross-subsidies across persons .... As the price of ill health goes down, the willingness
of individuals to take health risks will increase.").
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the extent to which their behavior responds to insurance incentives. After
all, how likely will a premium surcharge persuade someone to quit
smoking or engage in monogamous sex when the prospect of disease and
death did not?39 More importantly, the private insurance market does not
tie premiums closely to behavior anyway, because the cost is prohibi-
tive.40 As for administrative costs, the relative size of these in private and
social insurance is a controversial subject. However, the controversy is
mainly over whether social insurance would lower administrative costs,
since administrative costs are known to be high in private, risk-rated in-
dividual insurance.
CAN IT BE DoNE?
On the conceptual level, the economic and moral arguments in favor
of government action to guarantee universal access to a decent minimum
of health care seem robust to many Americans, if not to Professor Ep-
stein.4' There is, however, a practical question: Can a real government get
it done, at affordable cost? Epstein says definitely not:
In large measure, state intervention in health care markets yields out-
comes no different from those found elsewhere. Noble intentions quickly
lead to an endless tangle of hidden subsidies, perverse incentives, and
administrative nightmares which in the long run often backfire on its in-
tended beneficiaries, if not in the first generation, then like social secu-
rity, surely in the second. Government schemes are organized Ponzi op-
erations that eventually go broke by using the capital of later
contributors to satisfy the obligations to earlier plan participants.42
And,
The empirical objections to positive welfare rights cannot be overrun or ig-
nored; it is a feat of blind optimism to assume that any political process is ca-
pable of translating the idea of minimum standards into a set of workable
administrative norms, which must cover thousands of existing procedures,
39. Even less plausible is Epstein's contention that guaranteed access would lower health
status because it would remove the fear that one's medical history would make one uninsurable
sometime in the future. See id. at 57-58. It could be argued that universal access would actually
improve health-related behavior if it made individualized health information and cost-effective
preventive care more available.
40. Epstein himself says that private insurers are more likely to focus on the risk factors
that people cannot change, such as age, sex, ethnic background, personal and family medical
history, and genetic predisposition to illness. See id. at 122 (explaining that insurance companies
rely on simple, rough classifications to preserve the market equilibrium because they cannot
possibly gather at a reasonable cost all the information that is relevant to determining risk).
41. See, e.g., Robert J. Samuelson, Editorial, The Medicaid Morass, WASH. POST, Feb. 14,
1996, at A21 (citing two polls, from 1938 and 1991, which show that four out of five Americans
believed the government should provide access to health care for those unable to afford it).
42. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 2-3.
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with new ones coming on line all the time.43
The obvious response to these statements is: But it has been done.
Curiously, the book says almost nothing about health care systems in
other countries, despite the fact that almost all other industrialized coun-
tries do guarantee a basic standard of care, all spend a smaller percentage
of their total output on health care, and some even have better health
statistics." Like the United States, all are struggling with quality and cost
containment problems and some are experimenting with market-like fi-
nancial incentives within their social insurance systems.45 However, their
citizens are at least as content with their health care as Americans are
and show no signs of a desire to abandon social insurance for a pure pri-
vate market/charity regime.
Of course, what is possible in other countries may not be possible
here (although some comparative analysis would seem to be in order, to
explain why). This brings us to Epstein's analysis of selected health pro-
grams and policies in the United States.
LESSONS FROM AMERICAN HEALTH POLICY
Epstein's stated goal is to demonstrate the adverse economic effects
of interfering in individual and organizational autonomy in the vain at-
tempt to implement positive health care rights. In his policy explorations,
he claims an advantage as an outsider: "Although abstract theorists may
lack detailed knowledge on the specifics of health and related fields, they
can avoid the correlative risk of intellectual capture .... [T]he virtues of
an outsider are easily underappreciated: a broad command of theory and
its application in neighboring areas form a useful corrective against the
enthusiasms of special pleading.,
46
Unfortunately, with regard to health care, Professor Epstein has
waded in over his head. An outsider can indeed provide a fresh perspec-
tive on policy goals, but when it comes to explaining what is going on, de-
tailed knowledge is essential. Someone who intends to sing the praises of
market competition should also have a mastery of economic analysis.
The book's discussion of programs and policies simply doesn't work.
The choice of topics is idiosyncratic, and Epstein does not provide
43. Id. at 50.
44. See generally Gerard F. Anderson, In Search of Value: An International Comparison of
Cost, Access, and Outcome, 16 HEALTH AFF. 162 (1997). Of the 29 industrialized nations in the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), only the United States,
Turkey and Mexico had failed to achieve nearly universal health insurance coverage for all
their citizens as of 1995. See id. at 169.
45. See id.
46. EPsTEIN, supra note 1, at 5.
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enough background on the health care system to allow the reader to
place the topics in context. The analyses are flawed in interpretation and
inaccurate in details. They contain controversial statements unsupported
by argument or evidence and economic arguments that are incomprehen-
sible or wrong. Some selective comments can perhaps convey an impres-
sion of the problems found throughout the book. One problem is the
author's repeated references to the virtues of competitive markets, de-
spite the fact that health care markets don't meet the assumptions re-
quired for those virtues to be present. A typical example is his discussion
of the method Medicare uses to establish physician fees, which is based
on a resource-based relative value scale (RBRVS).47 He says, correctly,
that it is supposed to approximate a competitive market fee structure, 4
and then delivers a basic economics lecture on why an actual competitive
market process works much better. He says nothing, however, about the
imperfect information, uncertainty, agency, and insurance issues that
prevent a real physician services market from behaving like the market
he describes. He also says nothing about the payment method that the
RBRVS fee schedule replaced.49
Some statements about the way markets work are simply wrong. As
an example:
[S]uppose the same procedure can be used to save the life of a young woman or old
one, otherwise equal in all respects, whereby it yields a longer stream of benefits in the
first case than in the second. Or suppose that the same procedure can be used to save
the lives of two men of the same age, one of whom is a successful earner, and the other
will be a future burden on the system .... Those who are able to produce in the future
or to enjoy the long-term benefits of care are the persons who should receive it. Where
markets are operative, the bidding reflects these differences ....
Not so. The bidding gives the treatment to the person who will pay
the most for it. That could be a seventy-year-old who offers every penny
of his accumulated wealth, easily outbidding a hard-working thirty-year-
old with no wealth, and then lives his life out on social security. 1
Professor Epstein also does not understand the economic role of phy-
sicians, as the following passages demonstrate:
[I]t has been reported that standard office visits in California now take four
minutes-hardly time to generate empathy and trust, but enough time to
look into a pair of ears or check for a sore throat. Why should we expect oth-
47. See generally id. at 170-74.
48. See id. at 170.
49. For political reasons, the original Medicare program had to be as much like private in-
surance as possible. Thus, the original payment method, the Usual, Customary and Reasonable
(UCR) fee system, was modeled on the private insurance market. The UCR fee structure
proved to be distorted and inflationary; the RBRVS system, while far from perfect, is superior
to the inefficient system the private market produced.
50. Id. at 51.
51. The normative assumptions in this passage are also not obvious, and certainly do not
follow from economic theory.
Vol. 16:407, 1998
Health Care
erwise? The soft stuff may work, but its effectiveness is hard to verify. Physi-
cians are paid for the time they spend; their technical training is the expen-
sive input. Their psychological insights can be duplicated by others whose
hourly rate is far less. In other businesses, services are unbundled so that
high-priced labor does not tarry over tasks that less talented labor can pro-
vide .... 52
The better the test, the less interpretation and evaluation is required. The
physician becomes ancillary to the dominant sources of knowledge, and em-
pathetic intuitions are pushed aside by hard data. To have a physician chat
with each patient for five minutes out of an hour may not seem like much,
but over a year it amounts to a month of time .... 53
He does not realize that "the soft stuff" and "empathetic intuitions"
are core elements in medical practice. In a world of imperfect informa-
tion and uncertainty, we pay physicians to help us make the decisions we
would make if we had their medical knowledge and experience. They
cannot do this without spending enough time talking to us to understand
our goals and preferences. Moreover, sophisticated diagnostic technology
requires physicians with advanced cognitive and communication skills to
determine which tests are appropriate in a particular patient's circum-
stances and what the results mean.-4 The more resources are constrained,
the more important-and challenging-this decision-making role be-
comes.
The book contains no discussion of the Medicaid program (except for
a brief treatment of Oregon's Medicaid rationing experiment that em-
phasizes its relationship to the Americans with Disabilities Act).5 There
is a chapter on indigent care, but it focuses primarily on emergency care
and the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
(EMTALA).56 Since the complexities of Medicaid are overwhelming
even to an experienced health policy analyst, I have some sympathy for
his avoidance of the subject. Nevertheless, it is odd to read a chapter
called "Necessity and Indigent Care: The Right to Say No" that doesn't
so much as mention the main entitlement program for large categories of
the poor!' It is a lost opportunity: Medicaid exemplifies the conflict be-
tween an entitlement program that lacks efficient ways to limit care and a
52. Id. at 423.
53. Id. at 424.
54. Several articles on clinical problem-solving in the New England Journal of Medicine
provide a sense of this. See, e.g., Michael Berkwits & Stephen J. Gluckman, Seeking an Expert
Interpretation, 337 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1682 (1997); David J. Keljo & Robert H. Squires, Jr., Just
in Time, 334 NEw ENG. J. MED. 46 (1996); R. Sean Morrison et al., When Too Much is Too Lit-
tle, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1755 (1996); Yoseph Rosenman et al., Where Did Good Old Clinical
Diagnosis Go?, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1435 (1997).
55. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 116-20.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 87-105.
57. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 81-105.
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government that must limit expenditure, and the sly ways the system
finds to say no whether it has a right to or not.
Furthermore, Epstein barely mentions the tax subsidies to employ-
58ment-related health insurance. It is an extraordinary lapse, and the
omission makes his discussions of some insurance issues peculiar. For ex-
ample, he objects to the Americans with Disabilities Act on the grounds
that it forces employers to hire workers who will raise the firms' health
insurance costs, and he proposes an intricate contract-based solution to
job lock (the situation in which an employee hesitates to change jobs be-
cause he will lose insurance coverage).59 However, he does not make the
obvious point that these problems exist only because health insurance is
linked to employment, or inform the reader that this link exists primarily
because of a set of tax rules considered inefficient and inequitable by
both liberal and conservative economists. It is odd also that someone
who reveres personal autonomy seems positively enthusiastic about cre-
ating financial incentives that lead employers to control their employees'
personal behaviors with respect to diet, smoking, and exercise.
6
0
Instead of providing an organized discussion of moral hazard and the
need for non-price rationing in private and public insurance, he confuses
the reader by focusing on futility, which is only an arcane bioethics foot-
note to that discussion.61 The centerpiece of his treatment of futility is the
62Helga Wanglie case.
I shall examine the converse challenge to the autonomy principle within a
framework of positive rights: may a patient or his family secure public pay-
ment for futile treatment? Helga Wanglie's husband refused to allow physi-
cians to disconnect her life support systems even though at 86 years of age
she had been in a permanent vegetative state for over a year, at an estimated
cost between $800,000 and $1,000,000, expenses that were covered partly by
Medicare and partly by her Medigap insurance .... In the Wanglie case, the
state seeks to meddle in family affairs to protect its own pocketbook.
58. The topic of tax subsidies for employment-related health insurance only surfaces as a
minor point in a discussion of Medical Savings Accounts in Medicare. See id. at 182.
59. See id. at 141-45.
60. "[T]he New York subsidy plan undercuts any rate distinction between employed and
unemployed workers. Because firms can no longer capture the gains from keeping their workers
in trim by taking aggressive health measures, they are less likely to insist on exercise, diet, or
smoking restrictions." Id at 125.
61. In a world in which the need for limits on beneficial care is accepted, the precise divid-
ing line between positive and zero benefit is not important, because it is obvious that individuals
cannot make unlimited demands on common funds.
62. In re Conservatorship of Wanglie, No. PX-91-283 (Minn. Dist. Ct., June 28, 1991). For
background information about Wanglie, see Alex M. Capron, In Re Helga Wanglie, HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 21 (No. 5) (1991); Steven H. Miles, Informed Demand for "Non-Beneficial"
Medical Treatment, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 512 (1991), cited in EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 60.
63. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 60. But see Miles, supra note 62, at 513 ("Neither the hospital
nor the county had a financial interest in terminating treatment.").
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Unfortunately, he misrepresents the case. In re Wanglie was not about
the state (or, for that matter, any other entity) seeking to protect its
pocketbook. Medicare paid for the early phase of Mrs. Wanglie's treat-
ment, but during that phase, she was not in a persistent vegetative state,
and futility was not an issue." By the time the futility issue arose, she had
exhausted her Medicare hospital coverage, and private insurance was
covering the cost of life support."
Mrs. Wanglie's physicians and nurses began the legal process because
Mr. Wanglie was insisting that they provide care they considered medi-
cally inappropriate, since it could in no way benefit the patient.6 At the
request of the hospital ethics committee, the hospital's board of directors
(the county Board of Commissioners) authorized the health professionals
to seek a court ruling on whether they were obliged to provide care.67
The entities paying the medical bills (the private insurer and, to a much
lesser extent, Medicare) were not involved in the suit at all. 8
Since the funds at issue during the relevant treatment phase were
mostly private, the real question Epstein should be addressing is why the
private insurer took no steps to protect its policy-holders' resources. It
did not deny coverage, despite the fact that insurance contracts generally
define coverage in terms of "medically necessary care," and the health
professionals' position provided a solid basis for declaring the treatment
unnecessary in this case. If the company did not believe it had grounds
for denial-if it considered the contract language legally ambiguous-
why hadn't it used tighter language? What is interesting about this case is
the private insurance market's inability or unwillingness to impose rea-
sonable limits on care.
The futility chapter also contains a remarkable example of Professor
Epstein's penchant for contractual solutions to problems. He devotes five
pages to a proposal to deal with expenditures on end-of-life care by hav-
ing purchasers of insurance precommit to individualized termination of
care rules based on numerical scores on the APACHE (Acute Physiol-
ogy, Age, Chronic Health Evaluation) III, a 160 point severity of illness
scale used in intensive care units. 9 Although APACHE III can be used
to make estimates of survival probabilities, its creators consider it inap-
propriate for making treatment decisions in particular cases. Whether or
not they are correct, it is breathtakingly unrealistic to assume that con-
64. See Miles, supra note 62, at 512-13.
65. See id. at 513. According to customary practice, Medicare of course continued to be li-




69. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 72-76.
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sumers can use it as Epstein proposes in their insurance decisions:
[T]he relevant information could be presented to an individual or plan in
tabular form. Column A contains the APACHE III ratings, corrected for
various types of disorder, and the probability of death in hospital. Column B
contains a schedule of additional premiums for increasing APACHE III in-
surance by fixed-point intervals from APACHE 0 to APACHE 10, and so on
down the line to APACHE 120, 125, 130... , 160. These explicit tables are
meant to force honest ex ante revelations on consumers as to their willing-
ness to purchase health insurance increments, judged by its impact on their
survivability. This dramatic information could be supplemented by a further
breakdown that reveals the source of the increment .... Still additional fig-
ures could indicate the expected length of survival and quality of life for the
fraction of the population that leaves hospital. This information could be up-
dated regularly, and individuals could then shift the levels of health care pur-
70chased based on the revised information....
There are problems like these in every chapter of the book. In the
end, Epstein can't get where he wants to go by this route anyway. Ob-
servers across the ideological spectrum agree that the current health care
system is inefficient and inequitable; the disagreement is about what to
do about it. One cannot prove that government should stay out of health
care altogether by demonstrating that some government interventions
don't work.
MAKING HEALTH POLICY IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY
At the beginning of this review, I claimed that the rights debate is a
dangerous distraction. The danger lies in the encouragement it gives to a
mistaken view of policy-making. Early in the book, Professor Epstein
makes a revealing statement:
What is needed first is a theoretical discussion of whether the elevation of
health care as an affirmative right makes intellectual sense, regardless of its
magnetic appeal in the political realm. The details of individual programs ...
[are] ... subject to constant tugs from warring political factions. Yet none of
these short-term fixes ... is likely to be correctly undertaken unless and until
we answer collectively some fundamental questions of philosophy and eco-
nomics. The wrong conceptual apparatus always leads to the wrong practical
choices, no matter how much data is accumulated and analyzed.
The last sentence is not true. Obviously, the "right" conceptual appa-
ratus is better than the "wrong" one, and if the sentence said sometimes,
or often, I would not quarrel with it. But always? The fact is, different
conceptual frameworks can lead to the same practical choices, 7 and it's a
70. Id. at 73-74.
71. Id. at 28.
72. For example, refraining from sexual intercourse at the age of fourteen is the right prac-
tical choice, whether it is done for religious reasons or for fear of sexually transmitted diseases.
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good thing, too, or we would never be able to get anything done! The es-
sence of public policy is the identification of practical choices on which
people with incompatible conceptual frameworks can agree.
Designing a health care system is one of the most difficult tasks the
political process faces. The standard of care a society chooses to guaran-
tee its members is a complex compromise that must take account of the
amount considered morally obligatory, the amount a self-interested citi-
zen behind the veil of ignorance wants to be sure he can get, the amount
that responds to important social externalities, societal resource con-
straints, and a host of other factors. The funding structure is also a com-
plex compromise that must balance social norms of fairness against in-
centive effects and political influence. Inevitably, the result satisfies no
one completely.
This difficult task is certainly easier when all participants share the
same conceptual framework, but in a pluralistic society this does not
happen. Philosophical debates about rights can distract attention from
the more important work of discovering the common policies different
conceptual frameworks can support. Epstein argues that the decent
minimum is well-nigh indefinable at a philosophical level. Perhaps he is
right, but so what? It is difficult to define at a philosophical level the ex-
tent of a nation's obligation to the families of soldiers who die for their
country, or for that matter, the appropriate layout of an interstate high-
way system. We do not use this as an excuse to leave these matters to
private charity. Instead, we use the political process to find a practical
compromise we can all live with.
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RATIONING ISSUE
One important theme does emerge from Epstein's discussion of pol-
icy contradictions. This theme is the failure of the United States to come
to terms with the rationing issue. The debate about a right to health care
is irrelevant, but the rationing debate is not. Although acceptance of a
societal moral obligation to guarantee care has long been implicit in
health policy, it has not been accompanied by an appreciation of the ne-
cessity for limits on beneficial care in both private and public insurance.
Epstein is correct to flag our flawed social response to scarcity as a
key issue for health policy.73 His examples show what happens when peo-
ple try to make health policy in an environment in which the public does
not understand the rationing issue and can be manipulated easily by in-
terest groups.74 Under these conditions, rationing cannot be openly dis-
73. See id. at xi.
74. See, e.g., id at 174-81.
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cussed and equitable and efficient non-price rationing systems developed;
at the same time, people are not willing to provide the open-ended
funding that unlimited entitlements require. The outcome is contradic-
tory policies that make no sense on equity or efficiency grounds. Many of
his examples also illustrate the fundamental truth that discharging socie-
tal obligations requires societal funding and a national perspective. It
cannot be done on the cheap by unfunded regulation or legislation, be-
cause ordering individuals or organizations to meet societal obligations
without societal funding is unfair and doesn't work 5
In the end, however, Mortal Peril is part of the problem, not part of
the solution. The book fails to deliver either a solid philosophical discus-
sion of health care rights, a cogent analysis of existing health policy, or a
reasoned argument for a private market-based health care system. The
author seems to encourage people to see rationing as inevitably about
letting people die, when actually it is much more about reducing margin-
ally beneficial care across the board, in ways that would have little impact
on patient well-being. The book's harsh tone76 reinforces the public belief
that taking scarcity into account in health care is incompatible with a hu-
mane and generous society, instead of essential to it. As a result, the
book is more likely to hinder than to help progress toward public under-
standing of the key issues in health policy.
75. Asking them very nicely to do it voluntarily would not work, either, however.
76. For a final example of this tone, note Epstein's opinion on how to prevent "free-riding"
by people who do not buy insurance, assuming they will receive free care in the event of illness:
[T]he other unspoken alternative is not to supply that care in time of necessity at pub-
lic expense. If so, the alleged external cost disappears, even if some people die or are
injured. Yet if that bad outcome happens more than once or twice, the inability to ob-
tain the care in time of need will lead many young adults to think twice before going
without health insurance .... Social Darwinism is a bit too unfashionable in modern
circles of thought.
/a at 127.
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